Conflict of Laws Trends - Torts by Ausubel, Marvin V.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 19 
Issue 4 Summer 1970 Article 3 
Conflict of Laws Trends - Torts 
Marvin V. Ausubel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Marvin V. Ausubel, Conflict of Laws Trends - Torts, 19 DePaul L. Rev. 684 (1970) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol19/iss4/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
CONFLICT OF LAWS TRENDS-TORTS
MARVIN V. AUSUBEL*
NDER THE traditional choice-of-law rule, the law of the situs
governs the rights and liabilities of the parties. This rule still
prevails in some states,' though the decade of the sixties wit-
nessed a vigorous assault upon this time-honored proposition.
In a landmark case,2 William Jackson of Rochester, New York,
owned an automobile garaged, licensed and insured in New York.
Mr. Jackson, his wife and Miss Georgia Babcock left Rochester in
his car on a Friday for a weekend in Canada. While Mr. Jackson
was driving in Ontario, he lost control of his car, went off the road
and crashed into a stone wall, as a result of which Miss Babcock
was injured.
Miss Babcock commenced an action in New York against Mr.
Jackson to recover damages for her injuries. At the time of the acci-
dent, Ontario had a statute which prohibited a guest in an automo-
bile from recovering from the host-owner or driver. The defendant
moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground of the Ontario
statute. His motion was granted. The plaintiff appealed to the Ap-
pellate Division which affirmed the dismissal with a strong dissenting
opinion. On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, the order
of dismissal was reversed.
Judge Fuld, for the majority of the Court of Appeals, rejected the
traditional "vested rights theory" of conflict of laws because it failed
to take into consideration underlying policy factors. In lieu of this
traditional theory, he adopted the "dominant interests" principle, be-
* MR. AUSUBEL received his B.A. from New York University and his J.D. from
Harvard University Law School. He is a member of the New York Bar and is a
partner in the New York City firm of Berman & Frost. MR. AUSUBEL has lectured
extensively for the Practicing Law Institute, has been a guest lecturer at several
law schools, and has authored several books and law review articles.
1. See e.g. Goranson v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 345 F.2d 750 (6th Cir. 1965);
Glick v. Ballantine Produce, Inc., 343 F.2d 839 (8th Cir. 1965); Friday v. Smoot,
211 A.2d 594 (Del. 1965); McDaniel v. Sinn, 194 Kan. 625, 400 P.2d 1018 (1965).
2. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963).
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cause it afforded the appropriate approach for accommodating the
competing interests in tort cases with multi-state contacts.
Evaluating the competing interests, Judge Fuld held that New
York had a greater interest in insuring that the plaintiff, its domicili-
ary, had a right to recover than did Ontario in denying that right.
Comparison of the relative "contacts" and "interests" of New York and Ontario in
this litigation, vis-a-vis the issue here presented, makes it clear that the concern of
New York is unquestionably the greater and more direct and that the interest of On-
tario is at best minimal. The present action involves injuries sustained by a New
York guest as the result of the negligence of a New York host in the operation of an
automobile garaged, licensed and undoubtedly insured in New York, in the course of
a weekend journey which began and was to end there. In sharp contrast, Ontario's
sole relationship with the occurrence is the purely adventitious circumstance that the
accident occurred there. 3
While the plaintiffs right to recover would be governed by New
York law, the law of Ontario-that Province having the greater in-
terest in compelling obedience to its standards of conduct on its own
highways-would govern the issues of negligence and contributory
negligence.
Where the defendant's exercise of due care in the operation of his automobile is an
issue, the jurisdiction in which the allegedly wrongful conduct occurred will usually
have predominant, if not exclusive, concern. In such a case, it is appropriate to look
to the law of the place of the tort so as to give effect to that jurisdiction's interest in
regulating conduct within its borders, and it would be almost unthinkable to seek the
applicable rule in the law of some other place. 4
In substance, the New York Court of Appeals, by this decision,
abandoned an inflexible and easily predictable principle of the con-
flict of laws for a more flexible and less predictable one which, it
considered, would produce fairer and more just results. On the basis
of this decision, all of the issues arising out of a tort having a choice-
of-law need not be resolved by reference to the law of one jurisdic-
tion. Such issues may be treated separately, and a qualitative evalu-
ation made of the various factors to determine which laws of the
different jurisdictions will govern specific issues.
Since the Babcock case there has been a virtual avalanche of de-
cisions in New York and elsewhere applying the new choice-of-law
doctrine. The policy considerations supporting the new rule has
3. Id. at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
4. Id. at 483, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750-51.
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been thusly expressed by the New York Court of Appeals:
The difficulty which we found with this rule [traditional choice-of-law rule] was that
in giving controlling significance to the law of that jurisdiction in which the accident
took place, without considering the purpose of the laws in conflict, the rule
"ignore[d] the interest which jurisdictions other than that where the tort occurred
may have in the resolution of particular issues." 5
The appeal of the "dominant interest" approach is evidenced by
the fact that in addition to New York,' Alaska,7 Arizona,8 , Califor-
nia,9 Idaho,"° Illinois," Indiana," Iowa," Kentucky,1" Maine,",
5. Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 15, 237 N.E.2d 877, 878, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734,
736 (1968).
6. Ciprari v. Servicos Aeros Cruzeiro, 245 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969); Thomas
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 714, 249 N.E.2d 755, 301 N.Y.S.2d 973
(1969); Miller v. Miller, supra note 5; Farber v. Smolack, 20 N.Y.2d 198, 229 N.E.2d
36, 282 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1967); Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274
N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966); Long v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 16 N.Y.2d 377,
213 N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473,
191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). See also pre-Babcock death actions,
Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 912 (1963); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211
N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961); and post-Babcock death action, Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,
373 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967). (Each of these three actions arose out of the same air
crash that occurred in Massachusetts, whose Wrongful Death Act sharply limited the
amount which might be recovered for wrongful death and which measured damages
on the basis of the degree of defendant's culpability. The courts in these cases pro-
vided that the New York unlimited measure of damages should control where the de-
cedent-passengers were New Yorkers at the time of their deaths, without regard to the
states in which the next of kin were domiciled when the action was prosecuted.
These decisions, however, were apparently not premised upon a predominant in-
terest analysis of conflicting laws, but rather upon New York's state constitu-
tional history and strong public policy against limitations on recoveries for wrong-
ful death of its domiciliaries, even for out-of-state occurrences.)
New York State applies its own conflict of laws rule even where jurisdiction is
quasi in rem-i.e. based on attaching defendant's insurance contract. Tjepkema
v. Kenney, 31 App. Div. 2d 908, 298 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1st Dep't. 1969).
7. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699 (Alaska 1968).
8. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 447 P.2d 254 (Ariz. 1968).
9. Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
10. Rungee v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 92 Idaho 718, 449 P.2d 378 (1968)
(contract case).
11. Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D. II1. 1969);
Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966).
12. Watts v. Pioneer Corn Company, 342 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1965).
13. Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965). Cf. Fuerste
v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968).
14. Story v. Burgess, 420 S.W.2d 548 (Ky. 1967); Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.
2d 259 (Ky. 1967).
15. Beaulieu v. Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610 (Me. 1970).
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Minnesota,'6 Mississippi, I7 Missouri,' New Hampshire,' 9 New Jer-
sey,20 North Dakota,21 Oregon, 22 Pennsylvania,2" Rhode Island,2 4
South Dakota, 25 Texas,2 6 Wisconsin, 27 and the District of Colum-
bia, 2s have already apparently adopted the rule since its formulation.
16. Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968). See also
Kopp v. Rechtzigel, 273 Minn. 441, 141 N.W.2d 526 (1966); Balts v. Balts, 273
Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966).
17. Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968). (Mississippi applied its
own comparative negligence rule rather than the Louisiana contributory negligence
rule to a Louisiana accident involving a Mississippi decedent.)
18. Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969).
19. Dindo v. Whitney, 429 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970); Doiron v. Doiron, 109
N.H. 1, 241 A.2d 372 (1968); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966);
Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963).
20. Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., 55 N.J. 511, 263 A.2d 129 (1970); Mellk v.
Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967); Maffatone v. Woodson, 99 N.J.
Super. 559, 240 A.2d 693 (1968).
21. Trapp v. 4-10 Investment Corp., 424 F.2d 1261 (8th Cir. 1970).
22. Casey v. Manson Construction and Engineering Company, 247 Ore. 274,
428 P.2d 898 (1967).
23. Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964) (death
action-lex loci rule overruled and Pennsylvania applied its own liberal Wrongful
Death Act to its domiciliaries to an action arising out of an air crash in Colorado
which had a statutory limit on recovery); Kuchinic v. McCrory, 422 Pa. 620, 222
A.2d 897 (1966) (Pennsylvania law of liability for simple negligence held applicable
to Georgia airplane crash); Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 979 (1968); Prince v. Trustees of University of
Pennsylvania, 282 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Gatenby v. Altoona Aviation
Corp., 259 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Pa. 1966) (death action-plaintiffs' intestate
and beneficiaries, British citizens, governed by Pennsylvania law because of domi-
nance of Pennsylvania "contacts"); [Cf. Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d
854 (1970) (Delaware Guest Statute applicable to Delaware accident, involving
Delaware host and automobile registered and garaged in Delaware)].
24. Woodward v. Stewart, 243 A.2d 917 (R.I. 1968), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S.
957 (1968).
25. See Merchants' Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Fargo v. United States, 272 F.
Supp. 409 (D.N.D. 1967) (prediction that South Dakota would adopt grouping-
of-contacts rule).
26. See, Seguros Tepeyac, S.A. v. Bostrom, 347 F.2d 168, 175 (5th Cir. 1965);
Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968); Garza v. Grey-
hound Lines, Inc., 418 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); But cf. Doss v. Apache
Powder Company, 430 F.2d 1317, 1320 (5th Cir. 1970) which holds that under
Texas choice of law rules, in tort cases, the lex loci delicti governs.
27. Geehan v. Monahan, 382 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1967); Castonzo v. General
Cas. Co. of Wisconsin, 251 F. Supp. 948 (W.D. Wis. 1966); Conklin v. Homer,
38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968); Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co.,
38 Wis. 2d 98, 156 N.W.2d 466 (1968); Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151
N.W.2d 664 (1967); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
28. Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Williams v. Rawlings
Truck Line, Inc., 357 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Tramontana v. S.A. Empresa De
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The criteria for determining which law is applicable under the new
rule are as follows:
Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the
law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business
of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
These contracts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue. 29
The law of the situs will control insofar as what standards of con-
duct are applicable to a case. It has the dominant if not exclusive in-
terest in the care exercised by persons within the jurisdiction. Thus,
for example, in automobile cases, the state where the accident oc-
curred has the greatest interest in seeing to it that motorists observe
its rules of the road for the safety of all persons in that state, and
these rules will determine whether due care was exercised under the
circumstances of the case.
On the other hand, in determining what standards govern the ques-
tion of damages, the courts, in automobile cases, will normally look
to: (1) where the plaintiff was domiciled at the time of the occur-
rence of the accident; (2) where the defendant was domiciled at the
time of the occurrence of the accident; (3) the domicile of the parties
as of the time of the commencement of the action if that should vary
with the parties' domiciles at the time the accident occurred; (4) the
state in which the automobile was registered; (5) the state in which
the automobile was garaged; (6) the state in which the insurance
policy, if any, was written and the terms of its coverage; (7) the state
where the host-guest relationship arose, in passenger-guest cases;
(8) the nature of the trip involved in the subject accident and suit;
(9) the length of time the parties were sojourning in the state where
the accident occurred; (10) the conflicting policies, if any, upon
which the laws of the competing states having an interest in the con-
troversy are based, to determine whether there is a specific impedi-
ment to recovery; and (11) all other relevant factors bearing on the
Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
943 (1966).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS, Part II § 145 (P.O.D.
1968). New York apparently does not adopt "(d)" of this section. See n.32, infra.
688 [Vol. XIX:684
CONFLICT OF LAWS TRENDS-TORTS
interest of the various states having some concern with the subject
multistate tort.
APPLICATION OF THE NEW RULE TO SPECIFIC TYPES OF CASES
GUEST STATUTES AND OTHER LIMITATIONS ON RECOVERY IN EFFECT
IN THE STATE OF THE ACCIDENT
A very common personal injury case that has felt the impact of
the new choice-of-law rule is the one where the defendant asserts
that a guest-passenger is precluded from recovering from his host-
driver because of the guest statute in effect in the state where the ac-
cident occurred. In this type of case the defendant usually attempts
to have the forum bar recovery by applying the statute in effect in the
state where the accident occurred.
These statutes, where they permit any recovery at all, normally
require that a guest establish "gross negligence" or "wanton, wilfull
or reckless" conduct on the part of the driver as a condition of re-
covery. These enactments are usually premised upon a legislative
policy consideration of attempting to prevent collusive suits between
guests and hosts or to discourage free passengers from suing their
hosts and to protect local carriers and local insurers from such claims.
In Babcock v. Jackson, supra, defendant, a New Yorker, with
an automobile registered, garaged, and insured in New York, while
weekending in Ontario, Canada with plaintiff, a fellow New Yorker,
ran off the roadway into a stone wall. New York refused to enforce
the Ontario Guest Statute as Ontario had no interest in protecting a
New York owner and insurer under the circumstances of that case.
In Macey v. Rozbicki, supra, defendants, New Yorkers, had a
summer home in Ontario, Canada to which plaintiff, a New Yorker
and sister of one of the defendants, had gone on a ten day visit. A
week after plaintiff arrived in Canada, the parties, while on a purely
local trip, were involved in an automobile accident. The Court of
Appeals refused to apply the Ontario Guest Statute and instead ap-
plied the simple negligence rule of New York, the common domicile
of both the guest and the host.
In Miller v. Miller, supra, the accident happened in Maine. The
automobile was registered, garaged, and insured in Maine. Defend-
ants were residents of Maine. Plaintiff's testate, a New Yorker
1970]
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and a passenger in defendants' automobile, was related to defendants,
and had stayed in Maine on several occasions in connection with a
common family business he had with defendants in Maine. The
projected trip was planned and was to take place wholly in Maine.
The unlimited, New York measure of recovery for wrongful death,
rather than the Maine Wrongful Death Act, which limited recovery to
twenty thousand dollars, was held applicable.
In some instances where death ensues from an accident, the conflicts
issue does not involve a choice between a statute which provides a
specified limited monetary recovery and one that has no such limit.
Thus, in a recent case,30 a Pennsylvania domiciliary was struck in
New Jersey by a vehicle operated by a resident of New Jersey, which
was owned by a second New Jerseyan who insured it in New Jersey.
The decedent's estate was administered in Pennsylvania. The meas-
ure of recovery under Pennsylvania's law of damages in survival ac-
tions was far more generous to the plaintiff than the comparable New
Jersey statute. On the issue of which law of damages governed, the
Court, applying New Jersey's "governmental interest" choice-of-law
rule, wrote:
In view of the strong policy and concern of Pennsylvania with the administration of
the estates of its decedents and the comparable lack of strong policy in the State of
New Jersey, it is held that Pennsylvania law should apply under the facts of this case
as to the amount of damages recoverable in this survival action.8 1
As of this writing, Tooker v. Lopez, supra, represents the latest sig-
nificant development in this field. In that case the plaintiff's intestate
and the defendant, both New Yorkers, were fellow students in Michi-
gan and were involved in a one-car accident in Michigan, while on
a purely local trip in that state. The motor vehicle involved was in-
sured in New York. The New York Court of Appeals, reversing its
prior decision in Dym v. Gordon,32 held that New York and not
30. Foster v. Maldonado, 315 F. Supp. 1179 (D.N.J. 1970), leave to appeal
denied 433 F.2d 348 (3rd Cir. 1970).
31. Id. at 1183.
32. 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965). The facts in
the Dym case were substantially identical with those in the Tooker case with the
exception that the former was a two-car collision and involved the application of the
Colorado "guest statute", while the latter was a one-car accident that involved the
application of the Michigan "guest statute," In Dym the New York Court of Ap-
peals, Judge Burke writing, held that Colorado was the "seat of the guest-host rela-
tionship," there was an interest under the Colorado "guest statute" of denying a
guest a priority in the assets of the negligent defendant in favor of the "non-guests"
[Vol. XIX:684690
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Michigan law governed the standard for recovery:
The only justification for discrimination between injured guests which can withstand
logical as well as constitutional scrutiny [citing authorities] is that the legitimate
purpose of the statute-prevention of fraudulent claims against local insurers or the
protection of local automobile owners-is furthered by increasing the guest's burden
of proof. This purpose can never be vindicated when the insurer is a New York
carrier and the defendant is sued in the courts of this State. Under such circum-
stances, the jurisdiction enacting such a guest statute has absolutely no interest in
the application of its law.a3
An interesting example of how complex a conflict of laws case may
become is illustrated by a recent case tried in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York. K. Kevin Hepp,
Jr., an Illinois resident, and William Ireland, a New Yorker, were
fellow students in residence at a Colorado college. The latter bor-
rowed a jeep from his roommate, a Kansan. The vehicle was regis-
tered and insured in Kansas. In the course of a local trip in Colo-
rado, while Ireland and Hepp were in the jeep, it went out of control
and was involved in a one-car collision with a mountain. Hepp
sued Ireland alleging that the latter negligently operated the jeep
and that as a result he was injured. By happenstance, Colorado, the
situs of the accident, Illinois, the plaintiffs domicile, and Kansas, the
owner's domicile, all had guest statutes. The defendant set up the
Colorado guest statute as an affirmative defense, and, at trial, as-
serted the Illinois and Kansas Guest Statutes as possible alterna-
in the second motor vehicle. In Tooker the New York Court of Appeals rejected
both these considerations and Judge Burke, joining the majority, specifically indi-
cated "[F]rom all that has been written, it is apparent that our decision in Dym
is overruled." But cf. Hancock v. Holland, 63 Misc. 2d 811, 313 N.Y.S.2d 455(Sup. 1970), where a New York domiciliary passenger in vehicle #1, registered in
Georgia and owned and operated by defendant-Georgian, was involved in a head-
on collision in Georgia with vehicle #2, also registered in Georgia and owned and
operated by a Georgian. Occupants of vehicle #2 commenced suit in Georgia
against the owner-operator of vehicle #1 for personal injuries and property damage.
In this in rem action brought by the New York domiciliary against his host, it was
held that Georgia Guest Statute was applicable, since "Georgia's policy is to give
some preference to injured non-guests by requiring guests to prove gross or wilful
negligence before permitting guests to partake in the assets of the host-driver."
33. Tooker v. Lopez, supra note 6 at 575, 249 N.E.2d at 397, 301 N.Y.S.2d
at 524. (emphasis added) Cf. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 313 N.Y.S.2d 468, 63 Misc. 2d
766 (Sup. 1970) (Ontario resident-passenger in defendant-New Yorker's vehicle
was killed in a collision with co-defendant Canadian Railway's train in Ontario.
Held, the law of Ontario, including its guest statute was applicable. The purpose
and intent of that statute was to prevent the fraudulent assertion of claims by
passengers in collision with drivers and was binding on an Ontario domiciliary
plaintiff, particularly where co-defendant was likewise a domiciliary of Ontario).
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tive lines of defense.
The evidence established that defendant resided with his father,
who owned several automobiles. Each of these automobiles was
garaged, registered, and insured in New York. These insurance poli-
cies afforded coverage to the defendant as a member of the family
and household of the owner under their "omnibus provisions." In-
deed, these carriers arranged for the defense in the subject litigation
and, if necessary, for indemnity.
The court, applying New York's conflicts rule, held that the New
York simple negligence rule rather than any of the asserted guest
statutes governed the plaintiff's right to recover. While none of the
mentioned states having guest statutes had any interest in their appli-
cation to the subject litigants,
New York does have a policy of financial responsibility for motorists, and that's
usually thought of in terms of owners, but as its insurance law reflects, and as the
omnibus provisions we have been talking about reflects, it does not stop with owners.
It extends to all members of the family who are able to drive cars and New York's
paramount policy of relevancy here is that people injured by the negligence of mo-
torists reachable by New York policy should have available insurance recovery.3 4
INTRAFAMILIAL IMMUNITIES FROM LIABILITY IN THE STATE OF THE
ACCIDENT
A number of states preclude, or make extremely difficult, inter-
spousal suits or suits between parent and child. If an accident occurs
in such a state, will the forum which has no such immunity recognize
the immunity? Several jurisdictions who have adopted the new
choice-of-law rules have refused, under such circumstances, to pay
homage to this immunity upon the ground that the domicile of the
parties, and not the situs, has the most substantial interest in the issue
as to the permissibility of suits between members of the same family.
STATUTORY VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF OWNER FOR DRIVER'S NEGLIGENCE
In some states an owner is not liable for a driver's negligence ab-
sent proof of agency. Other states, such as New York, 35 impose
liability upon owners for negligent operation of motor vehicles in the
34. Hepp v. Ireland, 66 Civ. 2128, unreported trial decision by Judge Marvin E.
Frankel on April 8, 1970.
35. N.Y. VEH. & TRA. LAw, § 388 (McKinney 1960).
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state if the vehicle is operated or used with the knowledge or consent
of the owner, express or implied. The question has arisen whether
the provisions of such a statute will be given effect to an accident
occurring outside the state.
In Farber v. Smolack,36 New York's Vehicle & Traffic Law was
held applicable to a North Carolina accident, and in Maffatone v.
Woodson, the same statute was held applicable by a New Jersey
court to an accident in New Jersey.3 7
LOSS OF HUSBAND'S CONSORTIUM
The Supreme Court of Oregon in Casey v. Manson Construction
and Engineering Co., supra, held that Washington's rule which does
not recognize a wife's right of action for loss of her husband's consor-
tium, controls where the action arose out of a Washington accident
and was against two Washington corporations.
"BETTER LAW" RULE
Assuming the laws of the domicile of the plaintiff and/or the de-
fendant are less favorable to the plaintiff than the law of the situs, will
a court employing the new dominant interest analysis in choice-of-law
cases apply the less favorable domiciliary law? Judge Van Voorhis
anticipated this problem in his dissenting opinion in Babcock.
One wonders what would happen if contributory negligence were eliminated as a de-
fense by statute in another jurisdiction? Or if comparative negligence were estab-
lished as the rule in the other State?3 8
Those courts thus far confronted with this choice have applied the
"better law" rule.39
36. Supra note 6.
37. Accord, Johnson v. Hertz Corporation, 315 F. Supp. 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(New York held to have the predominant interest and its law of vicarious responsi-
bility applicable to diversity suit by Massachusetts residents against Delaware cor-
poration owning a New York registered vehicle involved in a New Jersey accident.
The New York automobile insurance laws "express a policy aimed at protecting
innocent victims of New York vehicle registrants, whether injured or harmed in
New York State or elsewhere.")
38. Babcock v. Jackson, supra note 6, at 487, 191 N.E.2d at 287, 240 N.Y.S.2d
at 754 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting).
39. In Fitzpatrick v. International Ry., 252 N.Y. 127, 169 N.E. 112 (1929), the
accident took place in the Province of Ontario. The plaintiff was contributorily
negligent and thus, under New York law, had no cause of action. He sued on the
theory that the law of the situs, Ontario, governed. Ontario then had a comparative
19701 693
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Kell v. Henderson40 was Babcock in reverse. All parties to the
action were Ontario residents. In the course of a weekend trip
to New York the driver lost control of his car and struck a bridge
in New York, resulting in personal injuries to the infant plaintiff.
The court, holding that the Ontario Guest Statute was not applicable,
said:
In our view Babcock v. Jackson (12 N.Y.2d 473) is inapplicable here because Bab-
cock (supra) was not intended to and did not change the established law of the State
of New York that a guest has a cause of action for personal injuries against a host
in an accident occurring within this State whether those involved are residents or
domiciliaries of the State or not.
4 1
In Heath v. Zelimer, supra, the host-driver from Ohio was operating
an automobile owned by her father, an Indiana resident. The ve-
hicle was garaged and insured in Indiana and the two passengers,
the driver's mother and sister, resided in Indiana. The trip com-
menced and was expected to end in Indiana. While travelling
through Wisconsin, the host collided with another vehicle, resulting in
injuries to the mother and sister. Indiana had a guest statute; Wis-
consin did not. The issue was whether the Indiana Guest Statute
limited the host-driver's liability to her Indiana guests. The Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin, which had previously adopted the new
choice-of-law rule in Wilcox v. Wilcox, held the guest statute inap-
plicable and the host liable under the common law of the situs-forum.
In arriving at its decision, the court considered that the law of the
forum-situs was the "better law" since guest statutes "are not con-
sistent with the present-day conditions in the field of motor-vehicle
control and automobile-accident law." 42
In Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co., supra, the issue before the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin was whether the Illinois Guest Statute or
the Wisconsin common law rule should be applied. The accident, in-
volving an automobile registered, garaged, and insured in Illinois, oc-
negligence rule. The Court of Appeals held that Ontario law controlled. Cf.
Frummer v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc., 60 Misc. 2d 840, 304 N.Y.S.2d 335
(1969). But see Watts v. Pioneer Corn Company, supra note 12.
40. 26 App. Div. 2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (3d Dep't 1966). Accord, Fosillo
v. Matthews, 59 Misc. 2d 539, 299 N.Y.S.2d 872 (Sup. Ct.), aIf'd 30 App. Div. 2d
1049, 295 N.Y.S.2d 327 (4th Dep't 1969), leave to appeal denied, 23 N.Y.2d 646
(1969).
41. Supra note 35 at 1553.
42. 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664.
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curred when the automobile, driven by an Illinois resident, struck a
tree in Wisconsin during the course of a trip which began and was to
end in Illinois. The injured passengers were Illinois residents. The
court refused to recognize the Illinois Guest Statute as an affirmative
defense. In so doing it favored the advancement of the forum's bet-
ter rule of law. Wisconsin's rule of liability to a passenger for ordi-
nary negligence, according to the court, was the better rule in con-
trast with the "outworn" Illinois Guest Statute.
In New York, a lower court was confronted with the problem
whether it would apply New York's recently pronounced doctrine of
intrafamilial liability for nonwilful torts to a suit brought by an infant
against his stepfather, both Floridians, and some others, defendants,
New Yorkers, where the accident occurred in New York. Florida
still retains the long-standing defense of parental immunity for un-
intended torts. The Court held that New York law governed and
the immunity doctrine was not available to the stepfather. The wrong
was committed in New York, the forum was in New York and New
York would permit a New York infant domiciliary to recover, un-
fettered by the immunity doctrine. Moreover, the interests of the
stepfather's co-defendants were totally New York oriented and the
payment of money damages would rest upon them alone if the step-
father were removed from the action by virtue of the ancient defense. 43
RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
Questions have arisen, and undoubtedly will continue to arise in-
volving the issue of the applicability of the doctrine of collateral es-
toppel in multistate litigation. For example, an American Airlines
craft crashed in Covington, Kentucky killing and injuring passengers
from various states. One passenger brought an action against the
carrier in Texas and prevailed in the federal trial and appellate courts.
Other passengers, New Yorkers as well as non-New Yorkers, sued
the same defendant in the state court in New York.
As to non-resident plaintiffs, the New York courts refused to pre-
clude the defendant from relitigating the issue of liability.44 On the
43. Pierce v. Helz, 64 Misc. 2d 131, 314 N.Y.S. 2d 453 (Sup. 1970).
44. Hart v. American Airlines, Inc., 31 App. Div. 2d 896, 297 N.Y.S.2d 587
(1st Dep't 1969).
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other hand, as to New York residents, the court held that the de-
fendant was so precluded, and directed summary judgment against
the carrier. 4" The decision in the non-resident's case was based
upon the strong policy consideration of deterring non-residents from
forum shopping-i.e. suing in New York because of its favorable con-
flicts and res judicata rules. On the other hand, as to New Yorkers,
the state would appear to have the dominant interest in the applica-
tion of its estoppel rule, and neither full faith and credit nor due
process would appear to preclude such an application.
It is the New York courts which would have the burden of relitigating an issue which
has already been adjudicated. By contrast, the sole basis for Texas' concern is the
fortuitous circumstance that the initial decision was rendered in Texas. No Texas
resident will be prejudiced by permitting the offensive use of the Texas judgment by
a New York plaintiff. There is no indication that application of the New York rule
will affect the integrity of Texas' requirement of mutuality of estoppel in wholly
domestic suits. 46
Thus, in states such as New York, which no longer recognize the
doctrine of mutuality, 47 collateral estoppel may be applicable to pre-
vent a defendant from relitigating its liability, once determined, if it
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the prior case.
CONSTITUTIONALITY
To date it has been argued that the application of the new "dom-
inant interest", conflicts rule which disregards the law of the situs, and
applies the forum's extraterritorially, is unconstitutional in that it vio-
lates the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution. This
argument has been rejected.48
45. Hart v. American Airlines, Inc., 61 Misc. 2d 41, 304 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Sup. Ct.
1969); DePaul v. George, 34 App. Div. 2d 620, 309 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1st Dep't 1970).
In action # 1 a passenger secured a judgment against a driver; in action #2 a second
passenger sued the same driver. It was held that the first judgment collaterally
estopped the defendant from relitigating liability and plaintiff was entitled to sum-
mary judgment and an assessment of damages in action #2.
46. 68 Col. L. Rev. 1590, 1600 (1968).
47. B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d. 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d
596 (1967); Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725,
298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969) accord, Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav.
Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942) (Traynor, J.); Coca Cola Co. v. Pepsi-
Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 130, 172 Atl. 260, 262 (1934).
48. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., supra note 6; Miller v. Miller, supra
note 5.
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TRANSFER OF ACTIONS-FORUM NON CONVENIENS
Certain state courts, such as those of New York, have held that
they are bound to try an action based on a foreign tort where either
the plaintiff or the defendant is a resident of the forum. 9 On the
other hand, a federal district court has the power to change the
venue of the action from one district to another (including a district
in another state), for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice., ° However, if such a transfer is made, the plain-
tiff does not lose the advantages and benefits of the substantive law
of the transferor forum because the transferee court must apply the
substantive law of the transferor state rather than that of the state in
which it sits.
In a case5' involving more than forty persons who were killed in
an air crash that occurred in Massachusetts, death actions were
brought in a federal district court in Pennsylvania. The defendants
moved to change the venue from the district court in Pennsylvania to
the district court in Massachusetts, in whose jurisdiction it was al-
leged, most of the witnesses resided and over one hundred other ac-
tions were pending, arising out of the same crash. The importance
of the proposed change of venue lay in the fact that if the Wrongful
Death Act of Massachusetts governed (and it would govern if the
action were transferred to the Massachusetts district court, and that
court applied the substantive law of Massachusetts), the plaintiffs
would be limited in their recovery of damages to a maximum of
$30,000, and the measure of damages would be the degree of the de-
fendants' culpability. On the other hand, if the Pennsylvania law
were applicable there would be neither a limitation on the recovery,
nor damages commensurate with the defendant's culpability.
The United States Supreme Court, in holding that the substantive
law of the transferor state, including its conflict of laws rules, gov-
erned, notwithstanding the propriety of the transfer under 28 U.S.C.
49. de La Bouillerie v. de Viennd, 300 N.Y. 60, 89 N.E.2d 15, 96 N.Y.S.2d
(1949); Wagner v. Braunsberg, 5 App. Div. 2d 564, 173 N.Y.S.2d 525 (1st Dep't
1958), Parente v. Kisner, 34 App. Div. 2d 244, 312 N.Y.S.2d 480 (3rd Dep't 1970);
McHugh v. Paley, 63 Misc. 2d 1092, 314 N.Y.S. 2d 208 (Sup. 1970).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964).
51. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
52. Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. t, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
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§ 1404 (a) (1964), significantly noted:
[W]e should ensure that the "accident" of federal diversity jurisdiction does not en-
able a party to utilize a transfer to achieve a result in federal court which could not
have been achieved in the courts of the State where the action was filed. This pur-
pose would be defeated in cases such as the present if nonresident defendants, prop-
erly subjected to suit in the transferor State (Pennsylvania), could invoke § 1404(a)
to gain the benefits of the laws of another jurisdiction (Massachusetts). What
Erie and the cases following it have sought was an identity or uniformity between
federal and state courts; and the fact that in most insatnces this could be achieved
by directing federal courts to apply the laws of the States "in which they sit" should
not obscure that, in applying the same reasoning to § 1404(a), the critical identity to
be maintained is between the Federal District Court which decides the case and the
courts of the State in which the action was filed.
We conclude, therefore, that in cases such as the present, where the defendants seek
transfer, the transferee District Court must be obligated to apply the state law that
would have been applied if there had been no change of venue. A change of venue
under § 1404(a) generally should be, with respect to state law, but a change of court-
rooms. We, therefore, reject the plaintiffs' contention that the transfer was neces-
sarily precluded by the likelihood that a prejudicial change of law would result. 53
CONCLUSION
With all of the inducements and necessities for travel in contem-
porary life, it is predictable that the number of citizens of one state
who will be involved in mishaps in other states and countries will
significantly increase, and thus, it will become increasingly more com-
mon for courts to deal with conflicts of law cases. This factor
coupled with expanding concepts of state jurisdiction will offer at-
torneys and courts new challenges and new opportunities for re-
fashioning the traditional rules of law governing the rights and lia-
bilities of parties. All of this will be done with the avowed purpose
of properly accommodating the competing interests of different states
and of securing more just results for litigants.
53. Supra note 51, at 638-39 (1964); Accord, Healy v. American Airlines, - F.
Supp. - (E.D. Ky. 1970); Ryer v. Harrisburg Kohl Brothers, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 7
(M.D. Pa. 1970) (conflict of laws rules of transferor forum applicable in transferee
forum even where original action was based upon jurisdiction quasi in rem, by
attaching insurance contract).
